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Abstract Ponzi-like investment schemes were popular in many transition econo-
mies. Often, some government officials had inside information about the viability 
of such schemes and used this information to their own advantage. We introduce 
a novel experimental design that allows us to study the extent to which this kind 
of abuse of information is possible and what consequences it has for those with-
out such information. In particular, we investigate how the proportion of informed 
versus uninformed investors and the promised dividends affect the way in which 
informed investors can exploit the investments of uninformed investors. Our results 
show that uninformed investors follow the observed choices of the informed even 
more than predicted by theory. This adds to the devastating effects that this kind of 
underground activity can have on the uninformed.
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1 Introduction
Many transition economies witnessed the rise and fall of lucrative investment oppor-
tunities offering spectacular dividends (van Brabant 1998). Though often based on 
valuable resources, the returns to investment were vastly overrated and dividends 
could only be covered by new investments. This characterizes such investment funds 
as Ponzi schemes.1 Such schemes are illegal and these investment opportunities 
were mostly observed in underground economies. When a scheme collapsed (as they 
all inevitably do), there was then no legal framework to support those who had lost 
their investments.
The important thing that all Ponzi schemes have in common is that to survive, 
they need to use invested funds to pay other investors. When there is insufficient 
money left (e.g., because investors start to withdraw), they collapse. The Ponzi 
schemes we are interested in typically involve the development of an overvalued 
resource such as oil, gas, minerals or real estate. The promoter convinces inves-
tors that the asset can be further developed with more capital, and the promoter will 
share the profits with the investors. Typically, substantial dividends are paid early 
on. The representation is that these dividends are ‘profits’ coming from the success-
ful development. What is actually happening is that the promoter is merely returning 
a portion of the investors’ money to them. These early and substantial dividends 
attract additional investors and induce early investors to increase their share. For 
the scheme to survive, the amount invested must exceed the amount needed for 
dividends.
A particular characteristic in some transition countries (most notably Albania in 
1997) aggravated the negative impact of these schemes (Sadiraj 1999; Shala 1997; 
Gërxhani and Schram 2009). This is that certain members of the government had 
inside information about the scheme’s viability. Instead of stopping the process 
early on, the common view is that they used this information to their own advantage 
by investing in the fund and getting out ‘on time’. The extent to which this type of 
inside information can be used to one’s own benefit and the consequences for the 
large group of uninformed investors are unknown, however. This paper addresses 
this issue.
For this purpose, we consider a Ponzi-scheme environment with two types of 
investors: informed and uninformed (Sadiraj et al. 1997). In the 1997 Ponzi schemes 
1 In 1920, the Italian-born immigrant Charles Ponzi offered investors in Massachusetts a 50% return on 
their investment in 90  days. He was using the money invested by others to pay out interest. The sys-
tem collapsed after 10,000 people had invested almost ten million dollars. The term ‘Ponzi-schemes’ is 
now used to describe games where individuals or companies pay out funds to some parties by borrow-
ing funds from others. Though the term ‘pyramid scheme’ is often used for this type of game, it should 
be noted that they are a specific kind of Ponzi scheme. First, a pyramid scheme involves investing for 
the right to receive compensation for introducing new participants. There is a clear understanding that 
success depends on attracting additional participants. In a non-pyramid Ponzi scheme (like the one by 
Ponzi himself), participants believe that success depends on the development of some productive asset. 
Second, pyramids must fail because their success depends on endless exponential participation growth. 
Other Ponzi schemes eventually fail because the underlying asset either never existed, or was grossly 
overvalued. Contrary to pyramid schemes, other Ponzi schemes can flourish even with passive investors.
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in Albania, for example, informed investors were governmental employees trying to 
exploit the influence they had. Informed investors control the main sources of infor-
mation dissemination, the media. They give positive information about the schemes 
suggesting, for example, government support. Their informational advantage allows 
informed investors to withdraw from the scheme on time.
It is very difficult to obtain observational field data on Ponzi schemes. Aside from 
the fact that many are illegal and, therefore, do not have public records, the records 
that are available generally have very noisy data. They have typically flourished in 
countries, where reliable data on variables like inflation or interest rates are difficult 
to find. Laboratory control allows one to circumvent these problems. Therefore, to 
better understand individual behavior in such schemes, we develop a novel labora-
tory experiment. We observe the behavior and decisions of individuals in an exper-
imental investment project with the main characteristics of Ponzi schemes. These 
include an unrealistically high-interest rate, the possibility of keeping the scheme 
alive using invested funds to pay interest and an increasing probability of bank-
ruptcy as time passes. In addition, as in Sadiraj et al. (1997), we distinguish between 
informed from uninformed investors. Our controlled Ponzi scheme allows for a real 
return to investments. This return may be insufficient to cover the interest paid, how-
ever. Only the informed investors know the real return. Our results show that Ponzi 
schemes can easily be generated in the laboratory. The duration of participation is 
unaffected by the aggregate number of investors, decreases with the relative number 
of informed investors, and decreases with the interest rate.
As far as we know, Ponzi schemes have not been studied in a laboratory setting 
before. There are two closely related phenomena that have been studied experimen-
tally, however. The first are bubbles in financial markets. These have many charac-
teristics similar to Ponzi schemes. Rationally, they should not occur. Nevertheless, 
it is generally believed that they do, and there is a vast theoretical literature trying 
to explain why (e.g., Brock 1982; Tirole 1985; O’Connell and Zeldes 1988; Gilles 
and LeRoy 1992). In addition, bubbles have been observed in laboratory markets 
(e.g., Smith et al. 1988; King 1993; Sunder 1995). Our paper adds to this literature 
by showing that Ponzi schemes are observed in the laboratory as well. The second-
related phenomenon are so-called bank runs (Shotter and Yorulmazer 2009; Brown 
et al. 2012). Like Ponzi schemes, large financial institutions are in danger of collaps-
ing if too many investors simultaneously want to withdraw their investments. An 
important difference is that Ponzi schemes need invested money to pay interest and 
will eventually collapse even if no investor withdraws.
2  The Ponzi game
In the game investors decide whether or not to invest a fixed sum Y (equal across 
investors) in an investment fund (IF). Investors j ∈ I ∪ U are either informed (j ∈ I) 
or uninformed (j ∈ U) . We use the notation ‘I’ (‘U’) both to denote the set of 
informed (uninformed) investors and the cardinality of these sets. The total number 
of (potential) investors is N = I + U.
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Before individual investment decisions are made (t = 0), there is an initial invest-
ment  in IF, reflecting real returns from a valuable underlying resource. We assume 
that nature draws  from a known set of integers between p and q, with equal prob-
abilities, i.e.,  ∈ {p,… , q} , with q > p > 0 . In period 1, informed investors are told 
the realization of  . They either invest Y in IF or invest nothing, giving an action 
space {0,Y} . As long as bankruptcy does not occur (see below), the game moves on 
to the uninformed.
There is a restriction in the actions allowed. If an investor has previously with-
drawn (i.e., she has invested zero after previously investing Y), she is not allowed 
to reinvest. This means that withdrawal is final. As will become clear, this restric-
tion simplifies the analysis considerably. As a consequence, the action space in 
later periods depends on previous choices. Having invested in period t, the investor 
must choose again in t + 1 whether to invest (choose “Y”) or withdraw (choose “0”). 
Those who have not previously invested or have invested in t − 1 thus face the same 
action space {0,Y} . Those who have invested 0 in period t2 after investing Y in t1 < t2 
(that is, they have ‘withdrawn’ a previous investment) can no longer invest and face 
action space {0}. In short, players can invest in period 1, or enter in a later period 
conditional on not having withdrawn an earlier investment. An investment can be 
withdrawn in any period as long as no bankruptcy has occurred. Finally, note that 
the fact that the players can only invest a fixed amount (Y) and cannot add to the 
investment in later periods is aimed at simplifying the environment for the theo-
retical analysis and experimental implementation. We leave such further options for 
future research.
The uninformed players do not know the realization of  but know that  is a sto-
chastic variable with known distribution. After the informed have made their deci-
sion in a period, and if bankruptcy does not occur, the uninformed choose a strategy 
from {0,Y} . If bankruptcy does not occur (see below), an interest payment j = djrY  
is subsequently paid to every j ∈ I,U , where d is a dummy denoting whether or not 
j is invested in IF and r is the interest rate. Interest payments are paid out of IF and 
diminish the amount available for the future. If the amount of interest previously 
paid is larger than  , then the money in IF is insufficient to pay back the investments 
to all investors, should they simultaneously withdraw. This makes the game a Ponzi 
scheme.
In any period, the informed have the option of withdrawing their funds before the 
uninformed make their decisions. The decisions by the informed are not made public 
until the end of the period. At that point, the aggregate investment decisions per type 
(informed and uninformed) are announced and a new period starts. Thus, when the 
informed make their decision, they know what the (aggregate) most recent decision 
of the uninformed is (and, knowing the realization of  , they know the exact amount 
of funds in IF). On the other hand, the uninformed know neither the realization of 
 , nor the most recent investment decisions of the informed when they decide what 
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to do.2 This is because the uninformed make a decision in t, after the informed have 
already done so. At that point, they know only all events up to the end of t − 1.
In every period, there are two points in time when bankruptcy may occur. First, 
when the informed make their investment decision, some might want to withdraw. 
If the amount they wish to withdraw is less than the funds available in IF, the with-
drawals are realized. If not, bankruptcy occurs. Second, at the end of the period, 
money is needed to pay for the withdrawals of the uninformed participants plus all 
interest payments. If there is enough money available in IF, these are realized. If not, 
bankruptcy occurs. In case of bankruptcy, the funds remaining in IF are equally split 
across all remaining investors.3 ESM Appendix A provides an overview of the time 
flow of the game.
Note that the uninformed in our game know that they are involved in a Ponzi 
scheme; they do not know, however, when it will collapse. For the experimental 
design, this is a choice made to avoid deceiving participants. The extent to which 
this harms the external validity of our results depends on whether or not investors 
outside the laboratory suspect that they are in a Ponzi scheme (but hope to benefit 
and withdraw on time). Given the nature of these schemes, it is unlikely that one 
would be able to elicit such suspicions in the field.4
3  Equilibrium investment
First, consider efficiency. Note that the initial investment  (the ‘real return’) can 
only be realized (earned by the subjects) if sufficient investments are made. Any 
(interest) earnings exceeding  are effectively a redistribution of income. Therefore, 
any outcome where there are sufficient investments to have  paid out as interest is 
efficient.
In this multi-stage game, a strategy is a complete plan of action. To start, con-
sider the case, where every player keeps Y  invested in every period. Then, bank-
ruptcy occurs and the remaining funds are distributed evenly. Each investor earns 
Y + ∕N . ESM Appendix A shows that this is generally not an equilibrium (it is not 
an equilibrium for the parameters used in our experiments). Similarly, no outcome 
can be an equilibrium if all investments are withdrawn and more than rY  is left in IF 
(because a single investor can increase her earnings by investing one more period).
In ESM Appendix A, we derive a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium for the game in 
quasi-symmetric strategies, i.e., symmetric strategies within the group of informed 
traders and symmetric strategies within the group of uninformed traders. This equi-
librium is characterized by three parameters tp ≤ t ≤ tq , defined as the maximum 
2 In Ponzi schemes outside the laboratory, the uninformed may or may not know the number of investors 
(informed and uninformed) in periods without bankruptcy. The key characteristic is that the uninformed 
can only find out too late that the informed withdrew. Our two-stage framework within each period 
allows us to capture this characteristic in a simple manner.
3 Note that the interest rate, r, may affect the timing of bankruptcy (the lower is r, the longer IF can sus-
tain interest payments), but not its consequences.
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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integer number of periods in which interest can be paid to all investors, using only 
the amount p, , q , respectively.
In this equilibrium, the following strategies are used. The uninformed start invest-
ing in period 1. The number of investment periods that maximizes their expected 












> tp . 
The uninformed withdraw in period tU + 1 , unless they observe at least one informed 
investor withdrawing in t∗ < tU , in which case they withdraw in t∗ + 1 (recall that 
j ∈ U does not know that j ∈ I has withdrawn until t∗ has been completed).
The informed start investing in period 1. They withdraw in tU if the realized draw 
of  is insufficient to pay interest to all investors for tU periods. Otherwise, they 
invest as long as  is sufficient to pay interest to all investors until tU and only the 
informed in t > tU . If some j ∈ U withdraw before tU , the informed stay in as long 
as  is sufficient to pay interest to all remaining investors.
This equilibrium is quite intuitive. The uninformed determine their optimal dura-
tion of investment, taking into account that the informed may take advantage of 
them. Unless the informed do something out of equilibrium (like withdraw unex-
pectedly early), their choices are not affected by what the informed do. The intui-
tion underlying the behavior of the informed is that they will withdraw at the last 
chance before the uninformed do if the latter are ‘overestimating’ the amount of 
money available. In this case, the informed will draw interest from the investments 
by the uninformed. If the uninformed are underestimating the amount available, the 
informed will stay in until  is (almost) depleted.
Finally, we note that with risk-neutral players there can be no equilibrium without 
interest being paid out of others’ investments for at least some draws of  . To see 
this, first note that all uninformed will stay in longer than tp periods. This is because 
doing so is dominated by staying in until tU > tp . Then, the informed withdrawing in 
period tp + 1 weakly dominates withdrawing in tp and they will stay in longer than tp 
periods. This means that for  = p they will draw interest from the investments by 
the uninformed, which creates a Ponzi situation.
4  Procedures and parameters
The experiments were run at the CREED laboratory of the University of Amster-
dam. Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population. In total, 224 sub-
jects participated. This experiment lasted about 1 h. On average, participants earned 
the equivalent of $17.
In all sessions, Y = 250. We used a complete 2 × 2 × 2 design, varying the 
number of participants ( N = 16 versus N = 12 ), the interest rate r ( r = 0.1 ver-
sus r = 0.2 ), and the relative number of informed, ( I = 1, U = N − 1 versus 
I = U = N∕2 ). The boundary values p and q depend on the number of partici-
pants. For N = 12 , we chose p = 1200, q = 3600 and for N = 16 , the values are 
proportionally higher: p = 1600, q = 4800 . We shall refer to the high (low) inter-
est sessions as Hi (Lo) and to the sessions with 1 informed subject(s) as 1. We will 
refer to sessions (N = 12 or N = 16) with half of the subjects informed by “8(6)”. 
Because we ran a full factorial between-subject design, we have eight treatments: 
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Hi 1 − 12;Hi 8 − 12; Lo 1 − 12; Lo 8 − 12;Hi 1 − 16;Hi 8 − 16; Lo 1 − 16; Lo 8 − 16 . 
We ran each session twice, for a total of 16 sessions. In each session, 8 different 
investment funds were run in 8 consecutive rounds. Each round continued until 
either there were no more investments or the investment fund was bankrupt.
The order of events and information flows in the experiment follow closely the 
model presented above. A translation of the instructions is provided in ESM Appen-
dix C. To minimize noise, the realized draws of  were made once for all sessions. 
They were reported to (only) the informed at the start of a round. We adapted the 
numbers across sessions to account for the distinct parameter configurations. We 
adapted  such, that t (the number of periods with enough ‘outside’ money to pay 
interest to all participants) was comparable across sessions. For example, in round 1 
of sessions with N = 16 and r = 0.1 ,  = 2400 was used. Then, 400 is paid in inter-
est in each period when all participants invest; ergo, t = 6 . To adapt for N = 12 , 
we used  = 0.75 × 2400 = 1800 . Here, 300 per period is paid in interest and once 
again t = 6 . For r = 0.2 , 800 (N = 16) or 600 (N = 12) is paid per period when eve-
ryone invests, implying t = 3 . To avoid income effects, we did not adjust  between 
the low- and high-interest sessions. We argue below that a simple rescaling of time 
makes the sessions with high and low interest rates comparable.5 Table 1 gives an 
overview of the realized random draws of  in the 8 rounds and the corresponding 
t values.
ESM Appendix B provides for each treatment an overview of the key variables 
that determine equilibrium behavior. These yield the following comparative static 
predictions:
1. The number of investors will not affect behavior.
2. An increase in the number of informed investors from 1 to 8(6) will decrease the 
duration of investment by the uninformed.
3. The duration of investment will be lower when r = 0.2 than when r = 0.1.
Table 1  Realized random draws of 
a 3200 in the high-interest sessions (see fn. 5)
b 2400 in the high-interest sessions (see fn. 5)
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 2400 4800 1600 1600 3600a 4000 2000b 3600a
t (low interest) 6 12 4 4 9 10 5 9
t (high interest) 3 6 2 2 4 5 3 4
5 In some cases, the value drawn for  was not dividable by 600 (800) and therefore not in the set used 
for the random draw in case of a high interest. In these cases we adjusted the value as described in the 
notes of Table 2.
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5  Experimental results
5.1  General results
A first question is whether the Ponzi schemes in the laboratory collapse like they 
do in the outside world. The answer is a clear ‘yes’. In all rounds of every session, a 
bankruptcy occurred: in the late periods of every round money invested by players 
was used to pay interest (i.e., the outcome was efficient).6 In this respect, the out-
come in the laboratory is no different than that in Massachusetts in 1920 or Albania 
in 1997. An important difference, however, is that the laboratory allows us to care-
fully study the development of the Ponzi scheme and the individual choices underly-
ing it.
Next, we consider the decision to enter the scheme. Rationally, there is no reason 
to enter later than period 1 (cf. ESM Appendix A). Indeed, it is optimal to enter in 
period 1, because in all treatments the amount available in IF is sufficient to pay 
interest in at least two periods ( tp = 2 ∨ tp = 4 in all treatments; cf. ESM Appendix 
B). Out of the 1792 individual participations in Ponzi games that we observed (224 
participants, 8 rounds each), only 2 (0.1%) did not invest in period 1. Hence, ‘late’ 
entry plays no role in our data.
We continue with an overview of the periods in which investors withdraw. For 
this purpose, Table  2 provides an overview of median withdrawal periods across 
treatments. This shows that a higher interest rate has the predicted effect of reducing 
the time spent in the investment fund. Moreover, the uninformed withdraw earlier 
when there are more informed than when there is only one informed. Statistical tests 
for treatment comparisons are provided below.
An overview of aggregate participation can be visualized using survival func-
tions, i.e., the fraction over time of subjects investing in the scheme. Figure 1 dis-
plays the raw data in this way.
Table 2  Median withdrawal period
Cells give the median period of withdrawal across all participants and all rounds in the treatment combi-
nation concerned. Recall that the equilibrium withdrawal period with high interest is half the equilibrium 
period with low interest. The numbers for the informed in cases with only one informed are based on 
only two individuals each, each with eight decisions
Low interest, r = 0.1 High interest, r = 0.2
I = 1 I = 6/8 I = 1 I = 6/8
N = 12 N = 16 N = 12 N = 16 N = 12 N = 16 N = 12 N = 16
Informed 6 12 11 10 7 7 6 6
Uninformed 12 12 10 10 7 7 6 6
6 It is not a priori obvious that they will collapse, because participants could withdraw their investment 
before  has been depleted.
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To make all sessions directly comparable, in this presentation of the data, we 
rescaled time by doubling the survival time of the sessions with a high-interest rate. 
This rescaling treats each investment decision as if it lasts for two periods. With 
this adjustment, for all sessions, the quasi-symmetric equilibrium derived above is 
for everyone to withdraw in period 12 in case of 1 informed player and for all unin-
formed (and if  is small, also the informed) to leave in period 8 when there are 6 
or 8 informed players (cf. ESM Appendix B). Figure 1 shows no such step func-
tion. Instead, investors start withdrawing as soon as investing becomes risky (period 
tp = 4 ), while many keep their money invested even when it is certain that interest 
is being paid out of subjects’ investments. This observation is not a consequence 
of aggregating across rounds with varying  values. We observe the same in indi-
vidual rounds. Nevertheless, the major decline in investment takes place between 
periods 8 and 12 in all sessions. Hence, in aggregate, behavior approximates that in 
equilibrium.7
5.2  Treatment effects
Result 1 The number of investors does not affect behavior.
Table 2 and Fig. 1 suggest that the number of subjects does not affect participa-
tion. This is confirmed by a Renyi test (Q = 2.41, p = 0.12, obs = 16).8 This supports 
prediction (1) in the previous section. Therefore, from here onward, we pool our 
data for N = 12 and N = 16 and continue the analysis of the other two treatment vari-
ations (interest rate and number of informed).
Result 2 An increase in the number of informed investors reduces the duration of 
investment by the uninformed.
Figure 2 shows the average survival functions per treatment (see ESM Appendix 
D for the functions split per session). Following result 1, we aggregate across N = 12 
and N = 16. Each line then shows the average across four sessions. The two black 
lines (solid and dashed) compare the low interest sessions with 1 and 8(6) informed 
investors. The grey lines do the same for the high-interest sessions.
Investors appear to keep their money in IF longer when there is 1 informed inves-
tor than when there are 8(6). Using a two-sample Renyi test we (marginally) reject 
the null of no effect for both cases (Q = 7.23, p < 0.01, obs = 8 , for low interest; 
7 Figure 1 truncates observations beyond period 18. Often, the fund remained ‘alive’ longer. In some 
cases, two or three investors tacitly colluded and stayed in until bankruptcy occurred when the fund 
could no longer pay interest.
8 The Renyi test is the analogue of a Kolomogorov Smirnov test that corrects for censored data. ‘obs’ 
refers to the number of uncensored observations, taking the session as the unit of observation. This gives 
eight observations per treatment. A power analysis indicates that 36 observations per treatment would be 
needed to obtain a power of 80%. The test is therefore underpowered. The actual difference, however, is 
small in size. If we were to treat each individual as an independent observation (increasing the power to 
over 99%), the difference would still be insignificant (Q = 1.86, p = 0.13, obs = 1.367). We are therefore 
confident of the robustness of this result. Similarly, we find no evidence of a group size effect when con-
ducted all tests reported below for our other two treatments separately for N = 12 and N = 16.
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Q = 6.30, p < 0.08, obs = 8 , for high interest).9 This confirms comparative static pre-
diction (2).
Result 3 The duration of investment is lower when r = 0.2 than when r = 0.1.
To compare the high and low interest sessions, first, consider the situation with-
out rescaling time for the high-interest sessions. There is then a very strong decrease 
in survival time. For both 1 and 8(6) informed investors, Renyi tests confirm the 
result (Q = 15.71, p < 0.01,obs = 8, for 1 informed investor; Q = 16.16, p < 0.01, 
obs = 8, for 8(6) informed investors). This confirms comparative static result (3).
As discussed above, rescaling is predicted to equalize the investment duration 
in the high and low interest cases. Figure  2 allows for this comparison by con-
sidering the two dashed lines (N = 1) or the two solid lines (N = 8). In both cases, 
higher interest appears to yield longer survival. Renyi tests show that the differ-
ence is significant for both one ( Q = 4.68, p < 0.01, obs = 8 ) and eight informed 
( Q = 5.15, p < 0.01, obs = 8 ). Hence, a higher interest is making subjects stay in 
longer after time rescaling. Even though the higher interest increases the per-period 
payoff, it also increases the probability of a bankruptcy. With our parameters, these 
two effects should cancel out in equilibrium, but apparently the higher interest 
makes our subjects take more risks.
Finally, ESM Appendix E provides evidence of learning. Specifically, there is 
lower variance in the survival functions of periods 5–8 than in periods 1–4.
5.3  Investment decisions
To better understand these results, we describe the observations in each session with 
a discrete (proportional) hazard model of the decision to withdraw money (e.g., Lan-
caster 1990, or Cameron and Trivedi 2005). This model describes the probability of 
withdrawing in period t conditional on participating in t − 1. This hazard rate is a 
function of the period and of a set of covariates, Z (which may or may not be time 
dependent). We apply a parameterization using the exponential distribution.10 The 
hazard rate t is given by:
where t is a baseline hazard that may vary across periods. When estimating the 
coefficients t and  , we correct for censored data (subjects cannot participate after 
bankruptcy, even though they would have chosen to).
We estimate three versions of the model. In each, we rescale time in the high-
interest sessions as described above. The models differ in the group of subjects 
involved and the variables used for Z. In model 1, we study the basic characteris-
tics in the structure of individual behavior. This model uses all choices (across 8 








9 Here (and in the tests for Result 3) we take a conservative approach and treat the mean across individu-
als and rounds as the unit of observation.
10 Equation (1) gives the continuous function underlying the decisions, which are only observed at dis-
joint time intervals. See, e.g., Lancaster (1990) or Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for details about the step 
from continuous time to discrete time intervals.
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rounds) by all participants. Z consists of two variables, one indicating the player 
type (informed or uninformed) and the other the  drawn. The latter is set to zero for 
the uninformed.
Models 2 and 3 test particular equilibrium predictions. Model 2 considers only 
the choices of the uninformed and model 3 only the choices of the informed. One 
characteristic of the equilibrium is that the uninformed do not react to the investment 
decisions of the informed (‘herding’) unless the latter withdraw before tU , which 
will not happen in equilibrium. Model 2 investigates herding. Here, Z (now time 
dependent) only consists of a variable describing the fraction of informed investors 
that withdrew in the previous period. In model 3 we test the prediction that the haz-
ard rate of the informed will be different when t𝜒 < tU than when the reverse holds. 
For this purpose Z consists of two variables, l and h . l =  if t𝜒 < tU , and l = 0 , 
otherwise. h =  if t𝜒 > tU , and h = 0 , otherwise. Our equilibrium prediction is 
that there will be no effect of l (the informed stay in until tU , irrespective of  ) and 
a negative effect of h.
Note that individual choices within a session are not independent observations. 
One way to deal with this is to estimate the models using all observations while 
clustering at the session level. Treatment effects can then be tested with dummies 
interacting specific treatments with the variables of interest. We follow this approach 
in ESM Appendix F. Here, we apply a method that more directly fits the treatment 
structure of our experimental design. We estimate the models for each session sepa-
rately. We then use the estimated coefficients as summary statistics for behavior in 
the session. We believe that the hazard coefficients are more informative statistics 
than, for example, the median period of withdrawal (cf. Table 2), because the struc-
ture of behavior is most accurately described by a hazard rate.11 We thus use the 
estimated coefficients to summarize the data per session. Because we are interested 
in the treatment comparisons, we will not discuss statistical properties of the esti-
mated hazard coefficients per se. Instead, we compare the coefficients across (groups 
of) sessions.
For each model, we have a set of estimated coefficients per session. This gives 
for each treatment cell four independent observations per coefficient. The aver-
age (across sessions) values of the coefficients estimated for model 1 are given in 
ESM Appendix G. The results show that the conditional probability of withdraw-
ing increases over time. Moreover, ceteris paribus, the informed are more likely to 
withdraw first. This counterintuitive result may be due to the fact that (as we will see 
below) the uninformed closely follow the behavior of the informed. The structure of 
the game is such that there is a one period delay between the moment an informed 
withdraws and the moment this is noticed by the uninformed. Finally, the estimates 
for model 1 show the intuitive result that the informed stay in longer when there 
11 Our approach has the advantage of not imposing assumptions about the error terms across treatments. 
Unless indicated otherwise, our results are robust to using the method of ESM Appendix F. By and large, 
our conclusions find slightly stronger support using the method in ESM Appendix F than in the main 
text.
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is more external money. Whether the behavior of the informed is in line with our 
benchmark equilibrium is tested in more detail in model 3, below.
In ESM Appendix G, we also use the estimates of model 1 for an additional test 
of treatment effects. We find, i.a., that the significant differences between high and 
low interest sessions are observed for the ‘risky’ periods 5–8 and 9–12. Though not 
rational (because time rescaling equalizes the risks), this is somewhat intuitive; it 
indicates that high-interest payments make it more attractive to risk facing bank-
ruptcy, because the immediate earnings via interest are higher. Similarly, there is a 
significant difference between 1 and 8 informed in the periods beyond 12, where it 
is certain that interest is being paid out of participants’ investments. To better under-
stand such results, we consider both types separately. First, we turn to model 2 and 
focus specifically on the choices of the uninformed.
Model 2 tests whether herding takes place. When estimating, we again correct 
for censored data. The estimation results per session are presented in Table 3. The 
“Herd” rows show the coefficients addressing the herd behavior discussed above.
The positive numbers observed in 13 of the 15 sessions, where we have estimates 
indicate herding. Hence, the uninformed seem more likely to withdraw if (some of) 
the informed did so previously. This is only the case, however, when there are mul-
tiple informed participants. A t test of the seven observations with one informed 
Table 3  Herding by the uninformed
Coefficients are estimated per session, using data from all rounds from only the uninformed for the 




 . Numbers give the coefficients for Eq. (1) of the variable 
depicted in the first column in the various sessions. Variables are defined in the main text
*/**/***Indicates that the average coefficient is statistically significantly different than 0 (t test) at the 
10-/5-/1%-level
a No coefficient is estimated, because the (one) informed always withdrew so early that no uninformed 
followed
Lo 1 Lo 1 Lo 1 Lo 1 Lo 8 Lo 8 Lo 8 Lo 8
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cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean coefficient is equal to zero (p = 0.14).12 
For the eight observations with eight (six) informed, a t test does reject the null 
hypothesis that the mean coefficient is zero (p < 0.01). The fact that the effect is 
stronger when there are eight (six) informed than when there is only one is sup-
ported by a Mann–Whitney test (p < 0.01, obs = 15). All in all, our results provide 
support for herding behavior by the uninformed, but only when there are sufficiently 
many informed participants to follow.13
Finally, model 3 tests the prediction that the informed will (not) adjust to varia-
tions in  when t is high (low). We test this by introducing the variables l and h 
described above. Table 3 (the rows “ l ” and “ h ”) presents the results for these vari-
ables per session. We note that for the sessions with one informed, the parameters 
imply that t𝜒 < tU , for all  (cf. ESM Appendix B). Hence, there are no observations 
for h in this treatment.
We observe that all of the 16 coefficients for l (where the predicted value is 
zero) and all of the 8 coefficients for h (predicted to be negative) are negative.14 
Contrary to rational reasoning, the result for l shows that the informed respond to 
lower values of  by a higher conditional probability of leaving the scheme even 
when t𝜒 < tU . This means that they do not expect the uninformed to stay in until the 
period that maximizes their expected earnings.
6  Conclusions
Ponzi schemes can have major consequences for the well-being of those involved. 
A better understanding of why they occur, their consequences, the role of informed 
insiders, and how they may be avoided in the future requires extensive theoretical 
and empirical research. In our laboratory experiment, the Ponzi schemes work simi-
lar to those in the outside world. Our experimental data thus allow us to get a first 
grasp at behavior in Ponzi schemes. It appears that our quasi-symmetric equilib-
rium captures the comparative statics reasonably well. As the model predicts for our 
parameterization, we find that participation duration (1) is unaffected by the number 
of investors; (2) decreases with the relative number of informed investors; and (3) 
decreases with the interest rate.
Nevertheless, there are features of the data that are not predicted by our bench-
mark. This may be due to the assumed risk neutrality. Even relaxing this assumption, 
however, will leave us with the observation of investments in periods when everyone 
can be certain that the initial investment  has been completely depleted. This sug-
gests that a model assuming common knowledge of rationality cannot explain the 
12 We note that the power of this test (0.39) is low. Importantly, as reported in the main text we do find 
that mean herding is significantly lower with one informed than with 8(6).
13 The results in ESM Appendix F also show significant herding when there is one informed.
14 The corresponding coefficients in the regression model of ESM Appendix F are all significantly nega-
tive.
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data. As argued by Tirole (1982), it is simply not rational to participate in a Ponzi 
scheme (in our case, after a certain amount of time), but people do.
An important conclusion from our data is that the distinction made between 
informed and uninformed investors matters. Contrary to our benchmark equilibrium, 
we find that the uninformed investors follow the movements of the informed and 
can, therefore, potentially be taken advantage of. Rationally, the uninformed should 
consider that it is in the interest of the informed to mislead them. The fact that the 
uninformed can be misled in this way is often considered a major reason for the 
occurrence of such schemes (Sadiraj et  al. 1997; Sadiraj 1999; or Bhattacharya 
2003).
Our results provide a dilemma to the informed wanting to start such a scheme. 
On the one hand, they would like to restrict the information to a ‘happy few’. On the 
other hand, our results show that an increase in their number will make the unin-
formed more susceptible to their behavior and, therefore, will increase the potential 
for making money off of them.
We believe that our experiments provide interesting insights into behavior in 
Ponzi schemes. Nevertheless, they also leave many important questions unan-
swered. For example, it would be interesting to see whether experienced subjects 
are less likely to lose money in these schemes. More fundamentally, we have not 
addressed the possibility of starting such schemes, or even of different participants 
starting competing schemes. In our view, this is an interesting topic deserving future 
attention.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
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